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ABSTRACT
A program to establish the technical feasibility and incentives for parti- J;
tioning (i.e., recovering) actinides from fuel cycle wastes and then |
transmuting them in power reactors to shorter-lived or stable nuclidas has i;
recently been concluded at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The feasi- la-
bility, was established by experimentally investigating the reduction that f|
can be practicably achieved in the actinide content.of the wastes sent to f
a geologic repository, and the;incentives for implementing this concept |
were defined by determining the incremental costs, risks, and benefits. |
Eight U.S. Department of Energy laboratories and three private companies f
participated in the program over its 3-year duration. |
A reference fuel cycle was chosen based on a self-generated plutonium f
recycle PWR, and chemical flowsheets based on solvent extraction and ion- I
exchange techniques were generated that have the potential to reduce |
actinides in fuel fabrication and reprocessing plant wastes to less than
0.25% of those in the spent fuel. Waste treatment facilities utilizing
these flowsheets were designed conceptually, and their costs were estimated.
Finally, the short-term (contemporary) risks from fuel cycle operations and
long-term (future) risks from deep geologic disposal of the wastes were
estimated for cases with and without partitioning and transmutation. We
concluded that, while both actinide partitioning from wastes and transmuta-
tion in power reactors appear to beJ feasible "using currently identified and
studied technology, implementation of this concept cannot be justified
because of the small long-term benefits and substantially increased costs
of the concept,
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper summarizes the results of an overall assessment of the feasibil-
ity and incentives for operating the nuclear fuel cycle so that the most
troublesome long-lived constituents of radioactive wastes are partitioned
and transmuted [1], Partitioning, when conducted for waste management
purposes, is defined as treatment designed to reduce the levels of chemical
elements having undesirable, long-lived isotopes in radioactive wastes to a
greater extent than that dictated by normal economic considerations.
Transmutation is defined as a process whereby long-lived nuclides are con-
verted to sb.orter-llv.ed or stable nuclides by bombardment with subatomic
particles, sucb as neutrons from nuclear power reactors. Partitioning and
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transmutation (P-T), when taken | togetheri form a waste management concept
which would be capable of reducing the amounts of certain long-lived, radio-
toxic species normally present in radioactive wastes and converting them to
shorter-lived or less toxic species.
Although we define P-T as a waste management option, it is clear that, when
all of the impacts of P-T on the nuclear fuel.cycle are considered, P-T is
really a new fuel cycle option which would affect most fuel cycle operations
to varying degrees. Tor'example, it_would:
1. require the installation ofadditionalwaste processing steps in. reproe=
essing and mixed-oxide (MOK) fuel fabrication plants,
2. alter the volume and composition of radioactive wastes being sent to a
waste repository,
3. require requalification of reactor fuels and possible new fuel fabrica-
tion techniques,
4. alter the neutronic behavior of nuclear reactors because of the presence
of recycled actinides in the fuel, and
5. necessitate new shipping cask designs because of the increased amounts
of neutron emitters present in nuclear materials containing recycled
actinides.
Thus, P-T constitutes an overall fuel cycle concept that is significantly
different from those involving the recycle, of only the principal fissile
and fertile values in spent fuels.
It is necessary for the fuel cycle being examined to be "closed" before the
•implementation of P-T can be evaluated or even considered. That is, pro-
visions must exist for reprocessing spent fuel to recover the principal
fissile and fertile values and fabricating them into fresh fuel. However,
it should be noted that this project represents the evaluation of an
advanced waste management alternative and should not be construed as advo-
cating or implying the eventual implementation of these technologies.
1.1 Background
Studies have been made of various selected aspects of P-T since the mid-
1960s. The most common type of study involved actiuide transmutation calcu-
lations followed by calculation of the radiotoxicity of the high-level waste
with and without transmutation of the actinides. The conclusion reached by
most of these studies was that the radiotoxicity, and therefore the risk,
due to high-level wastes in a repository could be reduced by factors of 100
to 200 for waste decay times greater than 1000 years [2]. These studies
generally ignored partitioning, many of the more realistic aspects of
transmutation, and other fuel cycle impacts of P-T.
Limited studies of partitioning processes and technology were conducted
during 1973-1975 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) [3]. The prin-
cipal results of this work were (1) evaluation and incorporation of the
experimental work into reprocessing plant flowsheets for partitioning
actinides from the waste streams, and (2) recommendations concerning the
approaches that should be used in future partitioning studies.
Only one realistic study has been made of the long-term benefits of removing
the actinides from high-level waste [4]. The previously mentioned studies
of long-term benefits that were based on the radiotoxicity index are not
realistic because this index assumes that the wastes are ingested directly
with no change in their composition, whereas in reality, any natural migra-
tion of these materials from the geosphere to the biosphere would not only
retard their release but also would result in changes in the elemental and
isotopic mixtures that might become available for ingestion. Reference [4],
which was based on a pathway analysis, concluded that ". . . for the situa-
tions investigated the incentives for a special effort to remove any
elements, including the transuranics, from high-level waste are vanishingly \
small. . ." However, since this study did not consider and compare the
near-term risks and costs of removing the actvinides from high-level waste to
the calculated benefits, it is difficult to say conclusively that the incen-
tives for actlnide removal are "vanishingly small."
No studies have been made of the other vairied, but important, impacts of- P-T
on the nuclear fuel cycle. , Examples of these impacts are the effects of the
highly neutron-active transplutoniura isotopes on fuel fabrication,'transpor-
tation, and handling; the effect of ngptuhium, americium, and curium on the
in-reactor behaviorJ fabricability, and cladding: compatibility of reactor
fuels; and the disposition of actinides produced prior to the implementation/
of P-T. Finally, and most importantly, there has been no comprehensive
study in which all short- and long-term advantages and disadvantages were
included. This is necessary if the incentives are to be realistically
evaluated.
In 1976, QRNL initiated a broadly based program consisting of both experi-
mental and computational activities that were .required to develop a
meaningful evaluation of the P-T concept, a Other organizations that partici-
pated in the program were Argonne National;«Laboratory, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Savannah River Laboratory, Sandia Laboratory,
Rocky Flats Plant, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Ralph H.
Parsons Company, Science Applications, Inc., and Los Alamos Technical Asso-
ciates. During the first 2 years of the program, ORNL and the first seven
organizations listed above conducted studies on specific aspects of P-T.
The results of this work were used.to develop fuel cycle material and facil-
ity descriptions which were, in turn, used as a basis for risk and cost
analyses by the last three organizations. The final part of the program
consisted of an overall assessment of the feasibility and incentives for
P-T, and specification of the research, development, and demonstration
(RD&D) requirements that would be needed for implementation. It is antici-
pated that the results of this program will be used by the U.S. Department
of Energy (USDOE) as the technical backup for a policy decision on the
future emphasis to be placed on P-T in the U.S. nuclear program.
1.2 Scope and Ground Rules
The procedures and detailed results of the initial studies and of the risk
and cost analyses conducted in the latter part of this program are summa-
rized in Refs. [1,5-10]. Details of these studies and analyses will riot be
given here except as required to support the feasibility, incentives, Vor
RD&D assessments.
The basic ground rules used to guide the P-T program were as follows:
1. Only conventional chemical processes with a reasonably high assurance
of near-term success and availability were considered.
2. The reprocessing flowsheets were based on coprocessing of uranium and
Plutonium in order that the resulting facilities be consistent with the
U.S.A.'s nonproliferation objectives.
3. LWRs were taken as the primary transmutation devices, but JBRs were
examined as potential alternatives.
4. The principal objective of the program was to obtain a meaningful and
defensible analysis of the feasibility, incentives, and not the develop-
ment of either the technology or an optimum P-T fuel cycle.
A qualitative evaluation of the potential impact of these approximations and
assumptions is given in Sect. 1.4.
1.3 General Approach
The general approach used in this program was to perform an "incremental
cost-risk/benefit analysis" of the P-T concept. To do this, two closed LWR
fuel cycles were defined. These fuel cycles are the same in all respects
except that the "reference" fuel cycle involved the use of a coprocessing
flowsheet for recovery and recycle of uranium and,plutonium, whereas the
"P-T" fuel cycle used additional:partitioning processes for the maximal
recovery of all actinides in refabrication*;and reprocessing plant wastes.
The reference and P-T fuel cycles are depicted jointly in Fig. 1. The ref-
erence fuel cycle includes everything to the left of the dashed, vertical
line. The fuel charged to the PWR is assumed to be comprised of 33% MOX
fuel and 67% enriched-uranium fuel. After an exposure of 33 GWd/MTIHM
(3 years in the reactor), the fuel is discharged, allowed to decay for
1.5 years, and then transported to the fuel reprocessing plant (FRP). The
fuel is reprocessed using a coprocessing Purex flowsheet adapted to recover
and purify uranium and plutonium with only a partial separation of the
uranium from the plutonium. After an additibtial 0.5-year decay, the recov-
ered uranium and. plutonium, together with a substantial fraction of the
neptunium, is se&i: to the colocated MOX fuel fabrication plant (FFP) where
33% of the fuel for the next reactor loading is fabricated. Some additional
















































Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of the reference and P-T fuel cycles.
the MOX fraction since the fissile plutonium content decreases as it is
recycled. The wastes sent to the repository include about 4% each of the
uranium and plutonium, 25% of the neptunium, virtually all of the fission
products, americium, curium, ^ C , and all fuel assembly structural materials.
The P-T cycle is similar to the reference cycle except that the waste treat-
ment facilities (WTFs) (to the right of the dashed line) are brought into
play. These facilities process the actinide-bearirig wastes from the fuel
reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication plants to reduce their actiriide con-
tents. The streams returning"to the1reprocessing; and fabrication plants are
the actinide-depleted (partitioned) wastes and the actinides that were
recovered by partitioning in the WTFs. The actinide-depfeted wastes are
conditioned for disposal, and the recovered actinides are mixed with the
uranium and plutonium recovered in the FRP and fabricated into fresh MOX
fuel. In the P-T cycle, the total amount of unrecovered actinides is about
0.25% of that in the spent fuel.
The fuel cycle operations where P-T is expected to have a significant impact
were characterized according to three criteria: risks, costs, and benefits.
Risk implies the short-term routine or accidental, radiological, or nonra-
diological impact of each facility. This risk was developed by using
effluent source terms for routine operation and/or probabilistic accident
frequencies and consequences with conventional meteorological and biological
pathway models. The third criterion, which denotes only the monetary cost,
is generated by developing conceptual plant designs and applying standard
costing techniques. The benefits refer to the reduction in the long-term
probabilistic dose from a waste repository. These benefits are determined
using computer codes that calculate 'the probabilistic accident consequences
for the repository and then use conventional meteorological and biological
models to determine the radiation dose to man.
The "incremental" risks, costs, and ibenefits of the operations in the two
fuel cycles that are attributable to P-T were calculated by examining
separately each of the fuel cycle operations depicted in Fig. 1. The advan-
tage of using an incremental analysis i3 that those operations not affected
by P-T will be identical in the two cycles (e.g., UO2 fabrication), and need
not be considered at all.
The only fuel cycle operations expected to be significantly affected by P-T,
and thus have nonzero incremental changes in the risks, benefits, or costs,
are (1) the FRP and its waste treatment facility, (2) the MOX fuel fabrica-
tion plant and its waste treatment facility, (3) the waste repository,
(4) the transmutation reactor, and (5) the transportation of fuels and
wastes. By defining the scopes of the fuel reprocessing and MOX fuel fabri-
cation plants appropriately, it was possible to neglect the differences in
these two facilities in the reference and P-T cycles and consider only their
respective waste treatment facilities.
Tui final step in the incentives analysis was to compare the risks, costs,
and benefits. This was done, first, by comparing them individually to other
"reference" values such as natural background for the risks and benefits
and the cost of electricity for the "no F-r" (reference) case. Next, the
risks, costs, and benefits were combined to yield the cost of reducing the
long-term risk from the waste repository by 1 man-rem (i.e., dollars per
man-rem for the P-T cycle). This value was then compared to the $1000/man-
rem guideline used in the United States to determine whether additional
waste treatment should be supplied for reactor effluents. The sensitivity
of the incentives for determination to uncertainties in data and the
effects of major assumptions vas also examined.
1.4 Major Assumptions
Four major assumptions were made in this assessment of P-T. The first was
that there is no process capable of partitioning the actinides that would
have a very low cost and impact (i.e., a "inagical" process). We believa
that, even though partitioning processes superior to those described herein
might be developed, they would not reduce the costs and impacts of P-T by
more than a factor of 2. j'
The second major assumption was that certain technological aspects' of P-T
are feasible even, though they have no firm experimental basis. Two impor-
tant examples are fuel performance and the operation of partitioning
facilities closely coupled to reprocessing and refabrication plants. Fuels
containing high concentrations of neptunium, americium, and curium were
assumed to have acceptable irradiation behavior based only on the accepta-
bility of uranium-plutonium fuels. All of the processes included in the
WTFs have been tested experimentally to some extent. However, there have
been no tests of an integrated flowsheet, with its many recycle streams and
possible impurities. Until such integrated tests are performed, the effect
of recycling these streams on the operability and performance of the facil-
ity is uncertain.
The third major assumption was that a probabilistic risk analysis is an
acceptable measure of the actual risks of operating fuel cycle facilities
and waste repositories. Although this approach has been widely used, it
has never been formally accepted by the responsible government agencies.
Finally, the fourth major assumption made in this analysis is that the
impact of P-T on fuel cycle facilities other than reprocessing and refabri-
cation plants is negligible and, therefore, that these facilities need not
be considered. In reality, there would probably be second- or third-order
effects of a detectable, but probably insignificant, magnitude on the other
facilities. The accuracy of this approximation can be verified only by
performing a detailed conceptual design of all fuel cycle facilities, an
undertaking that was far beyond the scope of this program.
2. PARTITIONING
Conceptual partitioning flowsheets were developed for both the fuel reproc-
essing and the MOX fuel fabrication plants [5],
2.1 Actinide Partitioning Flowsheets [51.
Partitioning of the wastes involves two generic steps: separation of the
actinides from the waste, and recovery of the actinides. The separation
step is accomplished by either leaching or breaking down strong organic-
actinide chemical compounds that interfere with their recovery. Recovery
is effected by using the following techniques:
1» The" tetravalent and hexavalent actinides (uranium, and plutonium) and
neptunium are recovered by TBP extraction, stripped from the solvent,
and returned to the parent facility.
2. The trivalent actinides (americiuTn and curium) and lanthanides are
coextracted from the waste using a bidentate compound, dihexyl-N,N-
diethylcarbamylmethylene phosphoaate (CMP). The residual waste is
returned to the parent facility for solidification before disposal.
3. The trivalent actinides are separated from the lanthanides using CEC.
The lanthanide fraction is returned to the parent facility and mixed
with the treated HLLW prior to solidification. The recovered actinides
(americium and curium) are returned to the parent facility for conver-
sion to the oxides
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Fig- 2. Generic actinide partitioning^ flowslieet
This sequence is depicted schematically in the generic flowsheet shown in
F i g . 2 . ' : .'.' • '. "• ••"•"••. • . ' - .',.•••' - . • • • ' : v . : - - - ' :
The high-level liquid waste (HLLW), which is the raffinate from a TBP first-
cycle solvent extraction in the FRP, is fed directly to the CMP extraction
and CEC processes. .The cladding hulls and dissolver solids,;which have '
been previously leached with nitric acid, are subjected to a final leaching
with HNQ3-HF for removal of additional actinides. The HEPA filter and in-
cinerator ash wastes from both the FRP and the FFP contain actinides that
are also largely insoluble in nitric acid. Consequently, these are leached
with HNO3-Ce(IV) solution. The Ce(IV) is produced by the electrolytic
oxidation of Ce(III); and when the leaching is complete, oxalic acid is
added to the system to convert Ce(IV) to Ce(III) to reduce equipment cor-
rosion rates^ The leachate is first contacted with TBP for the recovery of
uranium, neptunium, and plutonium and the trivalent actinides are then
recovered by extraction withCMP followed by CEC. The salt wastes, princi-
pally Na2C03 solutions from solvent cleanup, contain a variety of actinides,
some of which are boufld in non-strippable organic phosphoric complexes.
These complexes are destroyed by extraction of the phosphoric acids with
2-EHOH,. and the actinides are then recovered by TBP and CMP extraction
followed by CEC. -
All of the actinide-depleted wastes are returned to the parent facility for
final treatment (i.e., vitrification or concretion) and packaging for dis-
posal. In general, the increases in vaste volumes are held to a minimum
because the use of chemicals that can be recovered and recycled is
emphasized. Only the concreted wastes increase significantly in volume
0v5O%), and this is attributable to the reagents used in solvent cleanup
and CEC.
The total actinides reporting to the fuel cycle wastes for both the ref-
erence case and the P-T case are summarized in Table 1. As is evident, the
total amount of unrecovered actinides has been decreased over the reference
cycle by factors oi: 16 for uranium and plutonium, 100 for neptunium, and
400 for the transplutonium actinides. Only 25% of the neptunium reports to
wastes in the reference cycle because it fellows the uranium and plutonium
in the FRP's coprocessing flowsheet.
Table 1. Actinides in wastes of reference and P-T cycles
as a percentage of facility feed































The same values are assumed for berkelium and californium.
2.2 Partitioning of Technetium and Iodine
While procedures for partitioning technetium from the HLLW and dissolver
solids in which it occurs were not identified in these studies, we believe
that acceptable techniques could be devised within the framework of the
actiniae partitioning flowsheets that have been developed.
Iodii|f partitioning is, in effect, already incorporated in the reference
FRP Jiclowsheets. Its removal from FRP streams by techniques such as caustic
scrubbing, mercuric nitrate scrubbing, zeolite adsorption, charcoal adsorp-
tic/n, and the lodox process has been demonstrated.
2 & Feasibility of Actinide Partitioning
f/ix identifiable processes used in the partitioning facilities are described
.Jia Sect. 2.1: Purex (TBP) extraction, CMP extraction, cation exchange
/chromatography, 2-EHOH extraction, HNOo-HF Jleaching,^ and Ce(IV)-HNQ3 leach-
/ ing. Based on the engineering evaluations and experimental studies
/ conducted as a part of this program, we believe that all of these processes
/ are feasible and, consequently, that partitioning per se is feasible. Both
* TBP extraction and*HN03-HF leaching are well demonstrated technologies that
have been widely used within the nuclear program. CEC has also been demon-
strated, although less extensively than has the Purex process. The CMP
extraction process has been tested under radioactive conditions on small
samples of discharged LWR fuel and on Idaho Chemical Processing Plant waste.
Finally, both the 2-EHOH extraction and the Ce(IV)-HN03 leach processes
have been demonstrated with tracer levels of,actinides on a laboratory"
scale.
The principal caveat concerning the partitioning flowsheets developed in
the course of this program is that they are very highly integrated (.i.e.,
considerable internal recycle of plant streams is required) to prevent
actinides from reporting to the wastes. As a result, it is possible that
one or more chemical species having a detrimental effect on plant per-
formance could be formed and continue to build up within these streams.
Additionally, it should be noted that the CEC process, while judged to be
feasible, has some serious operational drawbacks resulting from radiation
damage to the resins by lkl>*kl*Cm. This results in a possible safety
hazard, due to the production of explosive degradation products, and in
increased cost and operational complexity.
2.4 Advanced Partitioning Processes
Taken in their entirety, these partitioning flowsheets are believed to
constitute a near-optimal partitioning .technology since (1) the reagents
are relatively radiation-stable, (2) the wide variety of wastes to be
treated will require multiple processes in any case, and (3) the processes
generally involve the use of reagents that permit the use of relatively
small and reliable equipment and result in only modest increases in final
waste volumes. The exception is the CEC process, where considerable im-
provement is desirable. A second possible advancement of partitioning
technology would be the integration of partitioning directly into the parent
facilities (i.e., the FRP or FFP), thus allowing overall optimization.
Based on the cost attributable to CEC and our engineering judgment, we be-
lieve that the combination of an improved actinide-lanthanide separation
process and an optimized, integrated reprocessiag-partitioning flowsheet
might reduce the cost of partitioning by as much as a factor of 2.
3. TRANSMUTATION [61 , '
3*1 Actinide Transmutation
Much of the available information on actinide transmutation is quantita-
. tively useless because of flaws in the calculational assumptions or
in. the methodology. The two principal problems in this regard are
that (1) many of the calculations allow unfissioned actinides to be removed
from the system during recycle and thus are not "closed"; and (2) incorrect
criteria are used to determine the enrichment of the fuel, which results in
substantial errors in the composition and transmutation rate of the recycled
actinides.
The primary transmutation device considered in this study was a PWR fueled
with self-generated plutonium. Recycle of the actinides to this reactor is
possible by any of several methods: (1) dispersing them homogeneously in
enriched uranium fuel, (2) dispersing them only in^fuel that is-snrirhed
with plutonium, (3) concentrating them in targgc rods in a noMai fuel as-
sembly, and (4) concentrating the actinides in an assembly composed totally
of target rods. Based on considerations of transmutation rate, fabrication
cost, and reactor operational considerations, it appears that the second
option is the preferred mode.
Based on the transmutation studies conducted as a part of this program as .
well as the results of other studies, the following statements concerning
actinide transmutation in PWRs can be made:
1. Actinide transmutation rates range from 5 to 7% per full-power year
(2.5 to 3.5% per calendar year).
2. The 2 3 3U enrichment penalty resulting from actinide recycle varies
from cycle to cycle but declines from a penalty, initially, to zero
at about the fifth recycle. Thereafter, the recycled actinides
result in a decrease in enrichment (i.e., benefit).
3. Recycle of the actinides results in increased amounts of 23SPu and
transplutonium actinides in the fuel, particularly the troublesome
Z^'Z^Cm and 252Cf nuclides.
4. The presence of the actinides in the PWR may cause significant
power peaking which may, in turn, require more extensive enrichment
grading within fuel assemblies.
Finally, and most importantly, subject to the acceptability of the actinide
recycle fuels (see Sect. 4.2), transmutation of the actinides appears to be
feasible and the impacts on the reactor do not appear to be unduly large.
However, operational changes would probably be required as a result of the
radiation and neutronic characteristics of the P-T fuels.
3.2 Technetium and Iodine Transmutation
Only brief, survey calculations have been performed concerning the transmu-
tation of technetium and iodine. If present as the metal (melting point
about 2400°K), 99Tc can be transmuted at the rate of about 11% per full-
power year. The products of the irradiation are, for the most part, stable
isotopes of ruthenium. Thus, the transmutation of 99Tc appears to be
feasible subject to the identification of an acceptable fuel form and to the
determination of the impact of small amounts of long-lived 9STc that would
be formed by irradiation of the 99Tc.
Assuming that iodine is present as sodium iodide, its transmutation rate is
about 3% per full-power year, which is relatively low. In addition, most
iodine compounds are volatile or unstable at reactor operating.temperatures;
iodine is very corrosive toward virtually all metals; and the transmutation
product is xenon gas, which could cause fuel rod pressurization problems.
Thus, it would appear that the transmutation of iodine in power reactors
should be considered to be marginally feasible at best.
3,3 Impact of Alternative Transmutation Devices
The use of thermal power reactors other than PWRs has been investigated to
some extent. In general, all of them were found to perform similarly to the
PWR when operating with their own self-generated actinides.
The use of high-flux thermal reactors as transmutation devices would offer
higher transmutation rates. However, these reactors are very expensive to
operate since they (1) typically require highly enriched uranium cores, (2)
usually operate at temperatures near the normal boiling point of water and
thus do not produce usable power, and (3) are generally small due to heat
removal cons-derations. Thus, high-flux thermal reactors should not be
considered for this application.
The use of LMFBRs as a transmutation device is the most widely studied acti-
nide transmutation option. The following statements can be made about trans-
mutation in LMFBRs:
1. The transmutation rate ranges from 5 to 11% per full-power year, depend-
ing on the actinide composition and the reactor design.
2. Actinide recycle has no significant impact on the fissile requirements,
breeding performance, or power peaking in the. LMFBR.
3. LMFBRs produce lower amounts of the principal neutron-active nuclides,
particularly 2S2Cf.
4. Actinide transmutation is feasible in LMFBRs, subject to the fabrication
of acceptable P-T fuels.
Based on- the available information, it would appear that given a choice be-
tween an existing LMFBR and an existing PWR as a transmutation device, the
LMFBR has a significant advantage. However, transmutation could ^e
implemented using only thermal reactors, provided adequate supplies of
fissile material remain available.
The use of projected fusion reactors as transmutation devices has also
been extensively studied. Recent calculations indicate that, while actinide
transmutation in the fusion reactor blanket is feasible, the transmutation
rates will probably not exceed those in an LMFBR due to material radiation
damage and heat transfer limitations.
The use of accelerator-driven spallation neutron transmutation devices would
appear to be an extremely inefficient method far nroducing neutrons in light
of the energy losses in, first, making electricity from heat and, then, in
converting the electricity to highly energized, charged particles. Further-
more, these devices are still limited by the same materials damage and heat
transfer considerations as LMFBRs. Thus, it is likely that spallation
reactors would be at a substantial cost disadvantage with respect to LMFBRs
and LWRs with no overriding benefits to compensate for this.
Nuclear explosives have also been proposed as a means for transmutation.
However, the large number of explosions required, their social and political
unacceptability, the fact that the residuals are irretrievably entombed
wherever the explosion occurs, and probable future restrictions on nuclear
explosives make this option very unattractive.
4. OTHER IMPACTS OF P-T T71
Four other.impacts of P-T on the fuel cycle that do not fall within either
the partitioning or transmutation areas are:
1. the effect of P-T fuels on fresh and spent fuel shipping cask design,
2. the impacts of P-T on fuel fabrication and the suitability of fuels
containing recycle actinides.
3. the impact of P-T on the disposition of fuel and/or waste inventories
that will accrue before partitioning could be implemented, and
4. the relationship of P-T to current U.S. nuclear policy.
• 4.1 Transportation Impacts
The design of a shipping cask for both fresh and spent P-T fuels is markedly
' different from that for ordinary MQX fuels because of the very high neutron
activity caused by zt*2>2kkCm and 252Cf present in the P-T fuels. A shipping
cask that appears to meet all applicable requirements was conceptually
designed as a part of the ORNL P-T program. In contrast to ordinary casks,
which are typically comprised of lead, steel, or uranium, this P-T cask
would be comprised of major amounts of boron carbide, copper, and lithium
hydride with stainless steel being used for structural integrity. These
unconventional materials are necessary to reduce the external dose rate from
neutrons to acceptable levels while maintaining the accident resistance
required of the casks. Another important aspect of the cask is that its
payload is only two-thirds of that for existing spent fuel casks because of
weight and size limitations.
4.2 Fabrication Impacts
The presence of the neutron emitters in the P-T fuels also affects the
design philosophy of the MOX fuel fabrication plant. In the reference case,
it was assumed that the fuel was fabricated remotely but that the plant
could be decontaninated for contact maintenance. However, in the P-T MOX
fuel plant, the fuel is considerably more radioactive due principally to the
neutrons. Increased shielding thickness must be provided; in addition, it
is unlikely that the plant could be sufficiently decontaminated to permit
contact maintenance. Thus, the P-T MOX fuel fabrication plant was assumed
to be both remotely operated and remotely maintained. This results in a
substantial cost penalty (see Sect. 5.1.1) in the fabrication process and
raises additional feasibility questions since a facility of this type has
never been built or operated.
A second impact of P-T on fabrication, is the higher concentrations of
neptunium, americium, and curium in the fuel. The resulting effect is to
question the suitability of the fuels with respect to their irradiation be-
havior (cracking, swelling, etc.) and their compatibility with the cladding.
In the recycle modes where these actinides are relatively dilute, this will
probably not be a problem. However, if target rods or assemblies with their
higher actinide concentrations are used, significant difficulties may be
manifested.
4.3 Impacts on Existing Inventories
The possible implementation of P-T at some time in the future leads to con-
siderations of the disposition of current spent fuel and/or waste inven-
tories. If too much of this material is committed to a repository, the
overall effect of P-T will be small because of the large amount of actinides
already in the repository. On the other hand, holding this material on the
surface is both more expensive and more risky. However, the decisive argu-
ment would appear to be that, since the actinides are shown to have a very
small impact on the risk from the repository, the quantity that is committed
to a repository is not of overriding importance.
4.4 Policy Implications
The implementation of P-T would conflict with current United States policy
that defers both reprocessing and the recycle of plutonium. Specifically,
P-T would require that the spent fuel be reprocessed and that all actinides,
including plutonium, be recycled. In fact, the processing and actinide
recycle required by P-T would be considerably greater than that for a stan-
dard uranium-plutonium fuel cycle.
A second policy conflict would occur if LMFBRs were to be used as transmu-
tation devices since the use of LMFBRs has also been deferred. Implemen-
tation of P-T would require the eventual use of LMFBRs because of long-term
limitations in the supply of fissile materials for thermal reactors.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE INCENTIVES FOR P-T
5.1 Costs, Risks; and Benefits of P-T
The cost of P-T is taken to be the increase in; the cost of nuclear elec-
tricity that wouldibe realized by^implementation of P-T. The risks include
the increases in short-term (contemporary) radiological and nonradiological
risks to the public resulting from the additional steps in the processing,
the larger quantities of actinides in the fuel cycle, and the greater number
of fresh and spent fuel shipments required. The benefits of P-T are derived
from the reduction in long-term risk from the repository that contains
actinide-depleted wastes.
5.1.1 Costs
The incremental cost of implementing P-T was estimated to be 1.58
mills/kWh(e) [7,8]. This cost is attributed to various fuel cycle functions
as follows: reprocessing waste treatment facility, 0-62 ^ |
MOX fuel fabrication waste treatment facility, O^46^iil j
MOX fuel fabrication penalty, 0.30 mill/kWtf"(e) [19%]; transportation, 0Tl6
mill/kWh(e) [10%]; waste management, 0.03 mill/kWh(e) [2%]; and fissile -
carrying charges, 0,01 mill/kWh(e) [1%]. J ' ;
The two waste treatment facilities are the principal partitioning facilities
in the P-T fuel cycle. The MOX fabrication penalty resultsrfrdm increased
shielding thickness and remote maintenance requirements. The incremental
transportation and waste management costs stem from the larger waste volume
and the smaller capacity of the cask needed to carry the fresh and spent
P-T fuel'.- The fissile cost is due to the interest charges on the larger
amount of plutonium in the P-T cycle.
The 1.58 mills/kWh(e) cost is equivalent to (1) $419 per kilogram of heavy
metal charged to the reactor, (2) 6.2% increase in the cost of nuclear-
generated electricity, and (3) $11.1 million per GW(e)-y.
5.1.2 Risks
The increase in short-term risk to the general public resulting from the
implementation of P-T is 0.57 health-effect per GW(e)-y [9]. This figure
is comprised of (1) 3 x 10"3 heaith-effects/GW(e)-y from increases in
routine (continuous) radiological releases due to the increased processing
and increased concentrations of toxic actinides; and, (2) 0.57 health-
effect /GW(e)-y due~ to increases in nonradiological risks, principally
petroleum ,combustion products from the generation of steam and heat at the
-waste treatment facilities and from physical damage during transportation.
As a basis of comparison, the rate from natural background is about 1.0
health-effect/GW(e)-y.
5-1,3 Benefits
Text oeaefit of P-T is the reduction in the expected long-term dose from the
l i c repository, assumed in this analysis to be located at the site of
waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Hew Mexico. The measure of the
used in this study is the number of health effects expected
f a m the. repository over 1 million years, per Unit of electrical capacity
t d by the waste in the repository. This risk value is 5.16 health-
)-y for the reference case and 5.10 for the P-T case, giving a
benefit of 0.06 health-effect/GW(e)-y [10]. These values are about 0.1
of the health effects dueito natural background. The benefit is principally
derived from the reduction in the amount of 22sRa in'.the repository. This
benefit is small because the nuclides that control the expected risk from
the repository are 99Tc and 1 2 9 I , which constitute 92% and 8% of the inte-
grated 1-nillion-year risk, respectively. The risk value includes contri-
butions from a slow-leach incident, a volcano growing through the repository,
and the impact of a very lrrge meteorite. Because the probability of either
the volcano or the meteorite impact is small (about once every 100 billion
years), these two events account for a small,contribution to the total
repository risk. In the more probable leach incident (about or?ce every 7
million years), the actinides are retarded during their migration through
the geosphere to such an extent that they do not emerge into the biosphere
in significant quantities within a million years.
5.1.4 Summary
Table 2 gives a summary of the costs, risks, and benefits of P-T expressed
on a GW(e)-y basis. The risk values in terms of health effects were con-
verted co man-rems using a conversion factor of 2 x 1Q~4 health effect/man-
rem. [11].
Table 2. Summary of the costs, risk, and benefits
Of P-T per GW(e)-y


































Includes nonradiological risks expressed as equivalent radiological impact
using a conversion factor of 5000 man-rems/health effect.
Expected dose integrated over 1 million years.
5.2 Incentives for Actinide P-T
The method used to determine whether there are any incentives for implement-
ing actinide P-T was to calculate the cose of reducing the expected long-
term risk by 1 man-rem and compare it to the $1000/man-rem guideline that
has been prescribed for use in determining ̂ whether additional effluent
control systems on reactor 'plants',', a|e justified [12]. If the cost of P-T
does not-meet this guideline there are presumably-alternative investments
for the money that would !save more lives than P-T; therefore, its implemen-
tation is not warranted, j; ;
It is evident from the data of Table 2 that there is more than one way to
generate t;he cost per man-rem-:;f igure^, principally because of the ̂components
of the short-term risk:. For; the purposes of this analysis .three values
were developed. The first wks the;cpst of reducing the expected long-term
risk irrespective of the short-term risk: $11,100,000/300 man-rem•••=.
$37,OOO/man-rem.!i -Ths^ second value was based on the net radiological risk
reduction, which i3 the long-term risk minus the short-term risk. This
value is $1},100,000/(300 - 16) man-rem, or $39iOOO/man-re'm. The final
value, which is based on the overall risk reduction, including the short-
term nonradiological risks, is $11,100,000/(300 - 2850) man-rem, or
-$4400/man-rem. This negative value should be interpreted as meaning that,
since the short-term risks;of P-T exceed the long-term benefits, we must pay
$4400 to increase the overall risk by 1 man-rem. It should be noted that,
if a nuclear plant were used to generate the process heat for the partition-
ing facilities, this value would be much smaller (in an absolute sense),
although it would still be negative because of the risk from transportation
accidents.
In summary, all three of the values fail by a wide margin to meet the
$100Q/man-rem criterion that would justify P-T; thus there are no apparent
incentives for its implementation. fThe justification^zor rejecting radio-
logical protection options on this basis is supported by the 1972 BEIB.
report [11]:
"The public must be protected from radiation but not to the extant that the
degree of protection provided results in the substitution of a worse hazard
for the radiation avoided. Additionally, there should not be attempted the
reduction of small risks even further at the cost of large sums of money that
spent otherwise would clearly produce a greater benefit."
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis r=
The validity of the conclusion that there are no safety or cost incentives
to implement P-T is subject to the sensitivity of the results to the assump-
tions and uncertainties in the analysis. The uncertainty in both the cost
analysis and the short-term risk analysis is estimated to be about a factor
of 2. The uncertainty in the cost7analysis represents the possible error in
cost estimation and the likely impact of partitioning improvements. The un-
certainty in short-term risk, which is small relative to most risk analyses,
results from uncertainties in the impact models used in the analysis. Such
uncertainties are smaller than those in most risk studies because the
principal contributors to the risk are routine effluents, which have a
probability of 1.0. By using these maximum uncertainties in a manner most
favorable to P-T, one can calculate that the expected long-term benefit of
actinide P-T must be about 5500 man-rems/GW(e)-y to reach the $1000/man-rem
value, about a factor of 20 larger than the calculated value of 300 man-
rems/GW(e)-y. The question is rtow reduced to considering the uncertainty of
the long-term risk analysis.
The long-term risk analysis has a number of large, known conservatisms built
into it. Principal among these are (1) the time horizon is extremely long,
i.e. 1 million years; (2) the release fractions from the volcano and
meteorite incidents are a factor of 10 to 20 greater than values which have
been used elsewhere [13], and these directly affect the long-term benefits;
(3) the fact that the repository risk model does not provide for the removal
of nuclides from the zones surrounding the repository by wind, river flow,
etc.; (4) the population is assumed to remain in place both during and after
volcanoes and meteorites; and (5) a conservatively small retardation factor
is used for 237Np (K^.= 8.1), the actinide most likely to emerge first into
the biosphere following a leach incident. It should be noted that this
approach was used simply because it was an expeditious way to examine the
incentives for implementing P-T, and should not be construed as being neces-
sarily appropriate for other studies of the same area or for studies oi
o t h e r a r e a s , ' ' "^ . • ' • • ' : ' • . - . • : - • . • • - i •:•-•, . - " - • - • • .• •• • •'•"••• " .. ,
On the other hand, there are other principal parameters where changes might
significantly increase the benefits of P-T. First, changes in either the
probability of the release fraction from the volcano or meteorite incidents,
which! are totally responsible for the calculated benefits ''pi P-T, would
directly affect the magnitude of the benefits. As noted above, the release
fraction is believed to be conservative by a factor of 10 to 20, although
the degree to which this value might vary is unknown.
A second class of parameters that might increase the calculated benefits of
P-T is related to the leach incident. The 300 man-rem/GW(e)-y benefit from
actinide P-T does not include any contribution from the leach incident since
the actinides are retarded to such an extent that they do not emerge into
the biosphere within 1 million years. However, by allowing changes in one
or more of the leach parameters, the migration rate of the actinides can be
accelerated to the point that they do emerge and contribute to the calcu-
lated leach incident consequences. The only parameter that could possibly
accomplish this is an increase in the water migration velocity through the
geosphere. It should be noted that a considerable increase in this value is
required before any changes in the benefits would be observed, but there-
after the benefits would increase linearly with parameter increases. That
is, there is a.threshold below which the leach incident is insignificant.
The water velocity assumed for this analysis is 1.46 m/year. The range of
velocities measured at the WIPP site varied from essentially zero to a
maximum of 4.6 m/year. Increasing the water velocity to 4.6 m/year would
increase the benefits of P-T by a factor of 10 or less. However, an ad-
ditional compensating factor is that the probability of a leach incident
used in the analysis (2 x 10""?/year) is believed to be conservatively higfi.
Thus, it would appear that the known conservatisms in the leach=incident
calculation would more than compensate for any possible uncertainties and
unknown nonconservatisms in the analysis.
5.4 Incentives for Technetium and Iodine P-T -_-=̂., -•---.-.•-—••
The benefits of technetium and iodine P-T, based on the conservative assump-
tions described previously, were about 100 times that of actinide P-T, or
about 30,000 man-rems/GW(e)-y. In addition, the costs and short-term risks
of partitioning may be smaller since technetium occurs only in the HLLW
and dissolver solids and iodine is found only in the dissolver off-gas.
Thus, it is likely that the cost-risk/benefit values for technetium and
iodine ?-T would be less than the $1000/man-rem criterion.; This would in-
dicate that, under the very conservative conditions used in the long-term
risk analysis, there is an incentive for technetium P-T and, ̂ f iodine trans-
mutation is feasible, there is sn incentive for iodine P-T. It snould be
noted that this conclusion is a direct result of the conservative value, used
for the leach incident probability. Even if this probability were reduced
by only a factor of 100, the incentives for both technetium and iodine P-T
would likely be eliminated.
6. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION REQUIREMENTS
As might be expected, considerable RD&D would be required before actinide
P-T could be commercially implemented. Partitioning studies are needed iri
a variety of areas. Principal among these are testing the integrated flow-
sheet and searching for an alternative to the CEC process for separating
actinides and Ian than ides. Cross-section .measurements;' and actinide trans-
mutation studies are required to identify more precisely the best recycle ;
modes and their likely impacts. Studies in the fabrication area, including
test irradiations, are required to determine the acceptability of fuels j
containing higher-than-normal concentrations of neptunium, americium, and
curium. A shipping cask, must be built of the relatively unusual materials
required to ship the neutron-active P-T fuels to ensure that they can be
fabricated and that the cask meets applicable safety regulations. Finally,
overall studies of the best methods for recycling the actinides would be
required.
It is estimated that this RD&D would take about 15 years and that it should
ba possible to have the first partitioning facilities on-line in 20 years,
assuming that the program was well-supported and that no licensing delays
occurred. The limiting aspects in this entire process are the RD&D require-
ments and the design and construction of the partitioning facilities.
The estimated cost of the RD&D, excluding the costs of the commercial-sized
plants, is about $900 million (1979 dollars). The largest portion of this




1. The partitioning of actinides appears to be feasible based on the use
of currently identified technology that has been experimentally tested
and some of which has been used in full-scale operations.
2. The partitioning of technetium has not been adequately investigated,
but there is presently no reason to believe that its recovery is not
feasible. .
3. Iodine partitioning is feasible using existing, demonstrated technology.
4. The transmutation of actinides appears to be feasible in thermal, fast,
and fusion reactors subject to the acceptability of fuels containing
higher-than-normal concentrations of neptunium, americium, and curium.
5. The transmutation of technstium appears to be feasible subject to the
identification of an acceptable fuel form.
6. The transmutation of iodine is marginally feasible at best because of
low transmutation rates, the volatility of iodine compounds, the produc-
tion of xenon gas as a transmutation product, and the corrosiveness
of iodine and its compounds.
7. The transportation of highly neutron-active P-T fuels appears to be
feasible at a reasonable cost.
8. Partitioning-transmutation may not currently be implemented in the
United States because of a nuclear policy which defers both reproces-
sing and plutonium recycle.
7.2 Incentives
1. The cost of actinide partitioning is relatively high, $11.1 million/
GW(e)-y, due to the variety of wastes that must be partitioned.
2. The short-term (contemporary) risks from P-T are substantial if the non-
radiological impacts are taken into account, amounting to 0.57 health-
effect/GW(e)-y. The short-term radiological risks are small, amounting
to 0.003 health-effect/GW(e)-y.
i. The long-term benefits (i.e., risk reduction) of P-T, using very conser-
vative assumptions, is small, amounting to only 0.06 health-effect/
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\. There are no incentives for actinide P-T, even if very conservative as-
sumptions are used in the analysis. The cost of the actinide^P-T bene-
fits is $39,000/man-rem if nonradiolo'gical risks are ignored, and the
short-term risks exceed the long-term-benefits integrated over a million
years if nonradiological risks are included,
5. There may be incentives for technetium P-T i;f very conservative long->
term risk analysis assumptions continue to be used and if partitioning
and target fabrication processes can ba developed.
6. There may be incentives for iodine P-T if very conservative long-term
risk analysis assumptions continue to be used and if a feasible method
for transmuting iodine can be identified.
7. Sensitivity analyses indicate that the above conclusions concerning the
incentives for F-T are valid for a wide range of input assumptions and
parameters.
8. The incentives for P-T are virtually independent of the transmutation
device used. Thus, the existence of advanced devices would not alter
the incentives.
7.3 Research, Development, and Demonstration Required
1. Approximately 20 years would be required to bring the first commercial-
sized partitioning facilities on-line, assuming a well-supported program
and no licensing delays. ,;
2. Approximately 15 years of intensive RD&D would be required at a cost of
about $900 million (1979 dollars). The RD&D needed for partitioning
requires the majority of the monies;and is the limiting aspect.of the
schedule.
3. As a result of the lack of incentives for actinide P-T, additional RD&D
in support of P-T is not warranted.
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